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Abstract
An optimal weighting scheme is proposed to construct economic, polit-
ical and financial risk indices in emerging markets using an approach that
relies on consistent tests for stochastic dominance eﬃciency. These tests
are considered for a given risk index with respect to all possible indices
constructed from a set of individual risk factors. The test statistics and
the estimators are computed using mixed integer programming methods.
We derive an economic, political and financial risk ranking of emerging
countries. Finally, an overall risk index is constructed. One main result
is that the financial risk is the leading contributor to sovereign risk in
emerging markets followed by the economic and political risk.
JEL Classifications: C12; C13; C14; C15; G01
Key Words: Nonparametric Stochastic Dominance,
Mixed Integer Programming; Sovereign Risk; Emerging economies.
1 Introduction
There is a growing awareness that sovereign debt crises can quickly mushroom
— as events in a number of emerging countries in the late 1990s have shown
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006)) and, more recently, as a consequence
of the global economic and financial crisis, that aﬀected public debt and sov-
ereign risk, hitting developed and emerging countries with varying intensity and
persistence.
It is also a common understanding that emerging economies are prone to fi-
nancial crises and some of the major financial crises aﬀecting emerging markets
in recent years have been linked to risky external and domestic debt compo-
sition, rollover risks, contingent interest payments and the poor credibility of
monetary and fiscal policies (see Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005); Hausmann
and Panizza (2003); Jeanne (2003); Zettelmeyer and Jeanne (2002)). Rating
downgrades were relatively rare until the 1990s, and when they occurred, were
of modest size and manageable. Nowadays, the credit quality of the sovereign
sector is by far more heterogeneous and unstable1. Also in view of the global-
ized dimension of economic and financial markets, country risk assessment has
become a more urgent matter now than ever.
And yet, there is no good understanding of the sources of vulnerability and
of the determinants of country risk. Whether the problem is a weak banking
sector, an excessive public or private sector external burden, some structural
impediment to growth, lack of transparency of a country’s political institutions
- just to mention a few of the determinants considered by most providers of
risk ratings — a satisfactory comprehensive measure of country risk is still to
be found. A good index of country risk is also crucial for strengthening the
policy response towards economic improvement and sovereign creditworthiness.
The objective of our paper is to derive a new country risk index for emerging
markets that outperforms the most common existing sovereign risk indicators
and, at the same time, allows us to disentangle the contributions of economic,
political and financial risk factors.
There are many services measuring country risk. Among the foremost providers
of risk ratings, there are: the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); the
Institutional Investors (II); the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI);
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); Euromoney; and services of the major
rating agencies, that is, Standard & Poor’s; Moody’s and Fitch. The synopsis
in Figure 1 compares these indices.
All the above-mentioned indices are based on arbitrary weighting of the
relevant variables and most of them share the conventional wisdom that political
risk is the key determinant.
Relatively little research has focused on the construction of a country risk
1The rising threat of instability from sovereign debt problems worsened conditions in the
global financial system recently and is bound to derail the global recovery, according to the
International Monetary Fund, Stability Report: “sovereign risks remain elevated as markets
continue to focus on high public debt burdens, unfavourable growth dynamics, increased
rollover risks, and linkages to the banking system” (5 Oct 2010).
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index. Erb et al. (1999) explained this lack of academic work, especially for
emerging markets, because of the short time series that exist, making it very
diﬃcult to produce an accurate evaluation of the characteristics of the market.
To the best of our knowledge, the only work analyzing some measures of country
risk is Erb et al. (1996). They explore the political, economic, financial and
composite risk index from ICRG and the II country credit ratings and provide
a comparison of S&P’s and Moody’s ratings. They find out that rank order
correlation is higher between S&P’s or Moody’s rating and the ICRG financial
risk index. Moreover, through the construction of a portfolio of countries that
experienced a decrease in risk rating and a portfolio of countries that experienced
an increase in risk rating, they investigate whether the risk indices contain
information about future expected returns. They find that the financial risk
index contains the most information about future expected returns and the
political risk contains the least.
A broad literature has studied which factors determine or aﬀect a country’s
“ability” and “willingness to pay”. A first group of contributions investigates
the determinants of sovereign credit ratings. In their seminal paper, Cantor
and Packer (1996a) use regression analysis to measure the relative significance
of eight variables that are listed in Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s reports
and show that GDP growth, per capita income, external debt, inflation and
indicator variables for economic development and default history are the main
determinants of the ratings issued by S&P and Moody’s. Afonso (2003) updates
Cantor and Packer (1996a) and finds analogous outcomes. A further updating
is in Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2011), where a distinction between short-
and long-run determinants of sovereign ratings is introduced. They show that
the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, public debt level and the gov-
ernment balance sheet have a consistent short-run impact, while the level of
external debt and external reserves together with government eﬀectiveness are
important long-run determinants. Another set of works examine the relation-
ship between spreads and sovereign ratings. Cantor and Packer (1996b) find
that agency disagreements over sovereign ratings are quite common and that
the rank orderings of sovereign risks implied by market yields frequently diﬀers
from the ratings assigned by the agencies. In particular, financial markets seem
to be more pessimistic about sovereign credit risk than are the rating agencies,
meaning that rating agencies undervalue the perception of financial risk. Such
diﬀerences of opinion appear to be most extreme for below investment-grade
countries. An updated comparison of sovereign ratings is in Flandreau et al.
(2009) and in Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2011), where possible spillover ef-
fects from lower rated countries to higher rated countries are also considered.
A recent work, assessing the eﬀect of sovereign credit rating announcements on
sovereign CDS spreads for emerging markets, is Ismalescu and Kazemi (2010).
There is a large empirical literature based on regression analyses that treat
a debt crisis as the dependent variable and a number of economic, political and
institutional variables as independent variables. The latter typically include
solvency indicators such as the ratio of debt to GDP, GDP growth, the real ex-
change rate, liquidity indicators and the level of international reserves. Several
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recent papers, such as Reinhart (2002), Catao and Sutton (2002), Reinhart et
al. (2003), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2004), Kruger and Messmacher (2004),
Catao and Kapur (2004), have included other institutional and political vari-
ables, debt history, financing needs indicators and macroeconomic volatility.
Some studies investigate the eﬀects of macroeconomic fundamentals on sov-
ereign credit spreads, under the view that a higher yield spread reflects higher
risk. Hilscher and Nosbuch (2010) focus on terms of trade for emerging markets
and examine the relative importance of country-specific and global factors. Hui
and Lo (2002) develop a model to value defaultable bonds and focus on foreign
exchange rates as the main variable to track the credit spreads in some emerg-
ing markets. Eichengreen and Mody (1998) conclude that changes in market
sentiment, not obviously related to fundamentals, have moved the markets by
large amounts.
The results from these studies are in keeping with most theories about “the
ability to pay” and the “willingness to pay”, and stress that sovereign debt risk
crises tend to occur more often the higher the debt to GDP ratio, the lower
growth, the lower reserves, the higher the financing needs and the worse the
quality of the institutions.
A serious shortcoming is that the construction of the above country risk
measures, as in the case of the separate analysis of single attributes, ignores
the association among the various risk factors. In this paper we will follow an
approach for the construction of aggregate indices for economic, political and fi-
nancial risk in emerging countries based on stochastic dominance (SD hereafter)
analysis. Constructing an optimal country risk index based on SD analysis has
advantages since it provides an eﬃcient index resulting from the least variable
combination of risk factors that oﬀers the maximum level of risk environment
over time for each country or group of countries. Moreover, relatively large data
sets are available, so that nonparametric analysis can let the data "speak for
themselves". The optimality of the index refers to the fact that it gives the
greatest value of risk environment for economic, political and financial sectors
in emerging countries. In other words, we will construct an index with those
weights given to each risk factor in each sub-index that will make it stochasti-
cally dominate all other competitor indices.
Mostly, stochastic dominance comparisons are made pair wise in the liter-
ature. Barrett and Donald (2003) developed pair wise stochastic dominance
comparisons that relied on Kolmogorov-Smirnov type tests developed within a
consistent testing environment. This oﬀers a generalization to Anderson (1996),
Beach and Davidson (1983), Davidson and Duclos (2000) who have looked at
second order stochastic dominance using tests that rely on pairwise comparisons
made at a fixed number of arbitrarily chosen points. This is not a desirable fea-
ture since it introduces the possibility of a test inconsistency. Linton et al.
(2005) propose a subsampling method which can deal with both dependent
samples and dependent observations within samples. This is appropriate for
conducting SD analysis with country panel data. In this context, comparisons
were available for pairs where one can compare risk levels in one year relative
to previous years and conclude whether there is a higher presence of risk or
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not. Gonzalo and Olmo (2010) introduce nonparametric consistent tests of con-
ditional stochastic dominance of arbitrary order in a dynamic setting. Both
Linton et al. (2005) and Gonzalo and Olmo (2010) propose consistent SD tests,
which could be applied also to sovereign risk analysis; however, although both
tests allow for comparison over time and among diﬀerent risk factors, they are re-
stricted to pairwise comparisons only. Lately, multi-variate (multidimensional)
comparisons have become more popular. In an application to optimal portfolio
construction in finance, Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010), hereafter ST, use SD
eﬃciency tests that can compare a given portfolio with an optimal diversified
portfolio constructed from a set of assets. In a related paper, Pinar et al. (2012)
use a similar approach to construct an optimal Human Development Index. In
this paper we follow the same methodology, using the set of risk variables (in
our case economic, political, and financial risk factors for each respective index)
to construct the optimal economic, political, and financial risk indices that do
not rely on arbitrary weights as rating institutions do.
An arbitrary weight to each risk factor would assign a predetermined or
“perceived” importance of it. It is possible that the importance of some risk
factors may change over time and may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent groups of coun-
tries. Some risk factors which are included in the overall risk index may become
obsolete and some other risk factors which are excluded from the analysis may
gain importance over time. In other words, as time passes, the evolution of
risk factors for diﬀerent groups of countries can vary over time (e.g., a new
set of country coverage may add new characteristics of risk to the existing
ones, and/or risk factors for any given cross section of countries may change
over time). Therefore, weights assigned to each risk factor may have to be
re-estimated over time2 . The main contribution of this paper is to derive an
optimal country risk index based on SD eﬃciency analysis. We use consistent
SD eﬃciency analysis to determine the optimal weights assessing the relative
importance of the risk factors for emerging market economies. By using SD ef-
ficiency analysis, we test the optimality of the equally-weighted risk index with
respect to all possible weighting combinations of risk factors and obtain the op-
timal risk index by maximizing the cumulative risk diﬀerence between a given
index (i.e. equally-weighted risk index) and the alternative one. Therefore, the
optimal risk index oﬀers the riskiest factors that are persistently high for emerg-
ing market economies rather than predetermined arbitrary weights, which are
commonly used by rating institutions.
The index we obtain will oﬀer the maximum level of risk environment in
emerging markets for a given probability level and also be the least volatile over
time among its set of competitors. By weighting each risk factor diﬀerently,
we find the riskiest economic, political and financial environment for a larger
number of countries over time than under the arbitrary weighted risk measures
2 In a related SD application, Pinar et al. (2012) carries out Monte Carlo simula-
tions allowing new observations with heterogeneous characteristics to enter the existing
data set. They found that the entrance of new observations with diﬀerent statistical
characteristics will result in a 2% to 3% change in the relative weights attached to the
individual components (see Pinar et al. 2012, Section 5.1).
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oﬀered by rating institutions. We also find the weighting scheme of each sub-
index (i.e. economic, political and financial risk) which oﬀers the overall riskiest
environment for the emerging economies.
Our findings have relevant policy implications too. The optimal economic,
political, financial and overall risk indices highlight the riskiest factors which
are persistently high for the majority of the emerging countries over time. This
implies that an emerging country should adjust its agenda consequently in order
to keep sovereign risk under control. We also find that the financial risk index
is the main contributor to overall risk for emerging markets. Thus, our analysis
is able to capture the growing expansion of the financial sector in emerging
countries and the leading role of monetary and financial institutions. Finally,
our paper contributes to the current debate on the reliability of the rating
assignment by S&P and its sister rating agencies. We show that our index
is not aﬀected by their documented reluctancy to change the rating class and
asymmetry between the upgrading and downgrading moves.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we examine the main
framework of analysis, define the notions of stochastic dominance and discuss
the general hypothesis for stochastic dominance of any order. In section 3 the
mathematical formulation of the tests is presented. Section 4 develops the em-
pirical analysis. We first look at the data used for economic, political and
financial indices and oﬀer descriptive statistics and use the ST methodology to
find the optimal index for economic, political, financial and overall risk envi-
ronment for emerging markets. Then we rank the countries for each sub-index
and the overall risk environment. A comparative analysis with the rankings of
the main rating agencies is oﬀered too. Finally, section 5 concludes. In the
appendix we describe practical ways to compute p-values for testing stochastic
dominance eﬃciency at any order by looking at block bootstrap methods and
discuss the theoretical justification for these methods.
2 Hypothesis, Test Statistics and Asymptotic
Properties
We consider a strictly stationary process {Y t; t ∈ Z} taking values in Rn. The
observations consist in a realization of {Y t; t = 1, ..., T}. These data corre-
spond to observed values of the n diﬀerent constituent components of the given
equally weighted risk index (τ ). We denote by F (y), the continuous cdf of
Y = (Y1, ..., Yn)0 at point y = (y1, ..., yn)0.
Let us consider a composite risk index λ ∈ L where L := {λ ∈ Rn+ : e0λ = 1}
and e is a vector made of ones. This means that all the diﬀerent components
have positive weight and that the composite index weights sum to one. Let us
denote by G(z,λ;F ) the cdf of the composite index value λ0Y at point z given
by G(z,λ;F ) :=
Z
Rn
I{λ0u ≤ z}dF (u).
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Further define for z ∈ R:
J1(z,λ;F ) := G(z,λ;F ),
J2(z,λ;F ) :=
Z z
−∞
G(u,λ;F )du =
Z z
−∞
J1(u,λ;F )du,
J3(z,λ;F ) :=
Z z
−∞
Z u
−∞
G(v,λ;F )dvdu =
Z z
−∞
J2(u,λ;F )du,
and so on.
From Davidson and Duclos (2000) Equation (2), we know that
Jj(z,λ;F ) =
Z z
−∞
1
(j − 1)! (z − u)
j−1dG(u,λ, F ),
which can be rewritten as
Jj(z,λ;F ) =
Z
Rn
1
(j − 1)! (z − λ
0u)j−1I{λ0u ≤ z}dF (u). (1)
The general hypotheses for testing the stochastic dominance eﬃciency of
order j of τ , hereafter SDEj , can be written compactly as:
Hj0 :Jj(z, τ ;F ) ≤ Jj(z,λ;F ) for all z ∈ R and for allλ ∈ L,
Hj1 :Jj(z, τ ;F ) > Jj(z,λ;F ) for some z ∈ R or for someλ ∈ L.
Under the null Hypothesis Hj0 there is no hybrid index λ constructed from
the set of risk factors that dominates the index τ at order j. In this case, the
function Jj(z, τ ;F ) is always lower than the function Jj(z, λ;F ) for all possible
hybrid indices λ for any risk level z. Under the alternative hypothesisHj1 , we can
construct a hybrid index λ that for some risk level z, the function Jj(z, τ ;F )
is greater than the function Jj(z, λ;F ). Thus, when j = 1, the index τ is
stochastically ineﬃcient at first order if and only if some other hybrid index λ
dominates it at some risk level z. Alternatively, the index τ is stochastically
eﬃcient at first order if and only if there is no hybrid index λ that dominates it
at all risk levels.
In particular we obtain SD at first and second order when j = 1 and j = 2,
respectively. The hypothesis for testing SD of order j of the distribution of
index τ over the distribution of index λ takes analogous forms, but for a given
λ instead of several of them.
2.1 Tests of the optimality of an index
Following ST and Pinar et al. (2012), the distribution of the hybrid index λ
dominates the distribution of the fixed weight risk index τ stochastically at first
order (SD1) if, for any risk level z, G(z, τ ;F ) ≥ G(z, λ;F ). If z denotes a risk
level, then the inequality in the definition means that the proportion of countries
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in distribution λ with value of risk outcome smaller than z is not larger than
the proportion of such countries in τ . In other words, there is at least as high a
proportion of risk level in λ as in τ . If the composite index λ dominates the index
τ at first order, then there is always lower risk in τ than in λ, so that λ suggests
a riskier environment. We test whether the composite economic, political and
financial risk index is optimally constructed using arbitrary weights (i.e. equal
weights to each risk factor in respective index), or whether we can obtain an
alternative composite index with optimal weights for the diﬀerent constituent
risk components of the composite index which implies a riskier environment.
Thus, we test whether the equally weighted risk index is optimal, or whether
we can construct a composite index λ from the set of the risk components in
the respective index that dominates the index.
The general hypotheses for testing the optimality of an equally-weighted risk
index τ , can be written compactly as:
H0 :G(z, τ ;F ) ≤ G(z,λ;F ) for all z ∈ R and for allλ ∈ L,
H1 :G(z, τ ;F ) > G(z,λ;F ) for some z ∈ R or for someλ ∈ L.
The empirical counterpart is simply obtained by integrating with respect to
the empirical distribution Fˆ of F , which yields:
Jj(z,λ; Fˆ ) = 1T
TX
t=1
1
(j − 1)! (z − λ
0Y t)j−1I{λ0Y t ≤ z},
and can be rewritten more compactly for j ≥ 2 as:
Jj(z,λ; Fˆ ) = 1T
TX
t=1
1
(j − 1)! (z − λ
0Y t)
j−1
+ .
2.2 Test Statistics and Asymptotic Distributions
The asymptotic distribution of Fˆ is given by
√
T (Fˆ − F ) which tends weakly
to a mean zero Gaussian process B ◦ F in the space of continuous functions
on Rn (see e.g. the multivariate functional central limit theorem for stationary
strongly mixing sequences stated in Rio (2000)). ST (2010) derive the limiting
behavior by using the Continuous Mapping Theorem (as in Lemma 1 of Barrett
and Donald (2003)), see ST (2010) Lemma 2.1.
We consider the weighted Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test statistic
Sˆj :=
√
T
1
T
sup
z,λ
h
Jj(z, τ ; Fˆ )− Jj(z,λ; Fˆ )
i
,
and a test based on the decision rule:
“ reject Hj0 if Sˆj > cj ”,
where cj is some critical value. (The derivation of the test is given by ST (2010)).
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In order to make the result operational, we need to find an appropriate
critical value cj . Since the distribution of the test statistic depends on the
underlying distribution, this is not an easy task, and we decide hereafter to rely
on a block bootstrap method to simulate p-values. The block bootstrap method
works well with a limited number of time dependent data (i.e., 200 to 450
observations in our empirical application) and also uses full sample information3.
3 Mathematical formulation of the test statis-
tics
The test statistic Sˆ1 for first order stochastic dominance eﬃciency is derived
using mixed integer programming formulations. The following is the full formu-
lation of the model:
max
z,λ
Sˆ1 =
√
T
1
T
TX
t=1
(Lt −Wt) (2a)
s.t.M(Lt − 1) ≤ z − τ 0Y t ≤MLt, ∀ t (2b)
M(Wt − 1) ≤ z − λ0Y t ≤MWt, ∀ t (2c)
e0λ = 1, (2d)
λ ≥ 0, (2e)
Wt ∈ {0, 1}, Lt ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ t (2f)
with M being a large constant.
The model is a mixed integer program maximizing the distance between
the sum over all scenarios of two binary variables,
1
T
TX
t=1
Lt and
1
T
TX
t=1
Wt which
represent G(z, τ ; Fˆ ) and G(z,λ; Fˆ ), respectively (the empirical cdf of τ and λ at
risk level z). According to inequalities (2b), Lt equals 1 for each scenario t ∈ T
for which z ≥ τ 0Y t, and 0 otherwise. Analogously, inequalities (2c) ensure that
Wt equals 1 for each scenario for which z ≥ λ0Y t. Equation (2d) defines the
sum of all portfolio weights to be unity, while inequality (2e) disallows negative
weights.
This formulation allows us to test the dominance of the equally weighted
risk index (τ ) over any potential linear combination λ of the risk factors that
are in the respective index.
When some of the variables are binary, corresponding to mixed integer pro-
gramming, the problem becomes NP-complete (non-polynomial, i.e., formally
intractable). The problem can be reformulated in order to reduce the solving
3The block size is set to l=10. ST (2010) test for their block sizes ranging from
l=4 to l=16 by step of 4 and find that the choice of block size does not change the
performance of their methodology. Similarly, diﬀerent block sizes are allowed here and
the results do not change significantly.
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time and to obtain a tractable formulation (see ST (2010), section 4.1 and the
appendix for the derivation of this formulation and details on practical imple-
mentation).
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use 34 variables in total to capture the risk outcomes in the economic, po-
litical and financial environments for emerging countries. The choice of these
variables is based on earlier studies aiming at identifying the potential determi-
nants of sovereign defaults and on the existing services measuring country risk.
The data set used in the analysis consists of annual data for several emerging
countries. The main sources are the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
from the International Monetary Fund, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
and national sources. Some data begin in 1980, but not all countries have data
going back that far. A detailed description of variables and sources is included
in Table 14.
Not only are economic and financial risk variables measured on diﬀerent
scales, but also a higher value in any of these variables may indicate a riskier or
a less risky environment for a country and as such these variables may not be
strictly comparable. As a result, we need to resort to normalization by scaling
each variable to unit range as: xijt =
Xijt−minXj
maxXj−minXj ,where Xijt represents an
outcome of variable j for country i at time t and xijt is the normalized outcome
of the variable in the range between 0 and 1.
Similarly, we normalize the political risk variables, so that each variable lies
in the 0 - 1 range. After normalization, we convert the values taken by each
variable so that higher values correspond to more risk. If a variable aﬀects
a country’s sovereign risk positively, then we normalize the variable to be xijt,
however if a variable aﬀects a country’s sovereign risk negatively, then we convert
the normalized outcome to be 1− xijt.
We use economic performance data consisting of nine macroeconomic vari-
ables that aﬀect a sovereign’s ability to service its debt. Variables that are used
to calculate the economic risk are: budget balance/GDP, current account/GDP,
total external debt/GDP, public debt/GDP, terms of trade, percentage change
of GDP, inflation, total debt per capita and eﬀective maturity. The economic
performance data form an unbalanced panel of 24 emerging countries over the
time period 1980 to 2010. The first panel of Table 2A presents the summary
statistics of each variable after linear scaling to unit range.
The political risk data consist of 16 rating variables, four of which scale up
to 10 and the remaining twelve scale up to 5. The group of the first four consists
of the variables: EIU political environment rating (PERT hereafter), EIU pol-
icy environment for foreign investment rating (FIRT hereafter), EIU political
4The authors are indebted to ABI Country Risk Forum staﬀ members for their
invaluable help in providing most data.
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stability rating (PSER hereafter) and institutional eﬀectiveness rating (IEER
hereafter). They are all scaled between 1 and 10, with 1 denoting the worst and
10 the best policy environment. The four rating variables that are scaled to 10
form a balanced data set of 32 emerging market countries for the period 1995-
2010 (the only exception is Azerbaijan for the period 1998-2010). The twelve
rating variables that are scaled to 5 are: risk of armed conflict (ACER hereafter),
risk of social unrest (SUER hereafter), terrorism threat (TRER hereafter), in-
ternational disputes and tensions (IDER hereafter), government stance towards
business (GBER hereafter), eﬀectiveness of system in policy implementation
(PIER hereafter), quality of bureaucracy (QBER hereafter), transparency and
fairness of legal system (ROFL hereafter), level of corruption (CRER hereafter),
impact of crime (ICER hereafter), degree of property rights protection (PRRT
hereafter), and fairness of tax system (TSER hereafter) with 1 denoting the
worst and 5 the best political environment for all of these. The group of rating
variables that are scaled to 5 forms a balanced data of 32 countries for the period
1994-2010 (with the exception of Azerbaijan for the period for 1998-2010 and
the Kazakhstan and Ukraine ratings for period 1995-2010). The second panel of
Table 2A presents the summary statistics of the rating variables that are scaled
to unit range.
The financial and banking sector data set consists of nine variables: 1) bank-
ing sector risk is scaled between 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest banking
sector risk; 2) composite stock market index in local currency5; 3) lending inter-
est rate, commercial banks average lending rate to non-financial enterprises; 4)
money market interest rate, weighted average yield on 13 week Treasury bills;
5) loans/assets, a liquidity ratio that indicates what percentage of the assets
of the bank are tied up in loans where the higher this ratio the less liquid the
banking system will be; 6) increase in interest arrears, i.e. change in cumulative
stock of unpaid interest charges due on long-term external debt at end-period;
7) increase in principal arrears, i.e. change in cumulative stock of overdue princi-
pal repayments on long-term external debt at end-period; 8) percentage change
in M1, total supply of notes and coins plus demand deposits at end-period,
over the previous year; and 9) percentage change in M2 plus quasi-money at
end-period, over the previous year. The third panel of Table 2A presents the
summary statistics of financial and banking sector variables after linear scaling
to unit range.
The three panels of Table 2B represent the summary statistics of economic,
political and financial risk factors respectively before the linear scaling to unit
range.
5The composite stock market index is in local currency, therefore, this variable is normal-
ized within the country. The highest and lowest stock market values experienced by a country
over time are used for normalization. Therefore, normalized values are obtained separately
for each country.
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4.2 Stationarity of the risk indices
In the previous section, we converted economic, political, financial and banking
sector variables into risk indices where higher index values represent a higher
risk environment. SD eﬃciency analysis requires the use of stationary data and,
as such, we would need to examine the properties of the risk factors in each
sub-index before applying SD eﬃciency tests. In this section, we test whether
the risk factor indices constructed from the actual variables are following a sta-
tionarity process by using standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root
tests. We use three diﬀerent ADF lag length decision criteria, Schwartz infor-
mation criterion (SBIC), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), and the Hannan
and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) and report all the test statistics for
each risk index in Table 3. Overall, all risk indices follow a stationary process
and as such we can proceed to apply the ST (2010) methodology to test for the
equally-weighted sub-indices (economic, political, financial and banking sector
risk environment) for the whole emerging markets group6 .
We should note that even though the risk factor indices follow a stationary
process, some of the variables for some countries follow a unit root process. In
the case of non-stationarity, rather than using the ST (2010) approach, one can
use the Linton et al. (2005) consistent tests of stochastic dominance under gen-
eral sampling schemes which allow for serial and mutual dependence between
random variables. Linton et al. (2005) use the subsampling method to approx-
imate the asymptotic null distributions of their test statistics which works well
in “many cases where the standard bootstrap fails: in heavy tailed distribu-
tions, in unit root cases, in cases where the parameter is on the boundary of
its space, etc”. Moreover, Gonzalo and Olmo (2010) improve on Linton et al.
(2005) method with nonparametric application which avoids parametric spec-
ification of the data generating process and allows for general forms of serial
and mutual dependence between stationary processes. Hence, both Linton et
al. (2005) and Gonzalo and Olmo (2010) consistent tests can be applied for the
sovereign risk analysis at a country level (i.e., whether one risk factor at a given
country is riskier when compared with another country). However, our analysis
is to examine the overall risk in emerging markets at a given time horizon rather
than consider a pairwise country specific risk analysis. Since each risk factor
index follows a stationary process in economic, political and financial and bank-
ing sector categories, in the next section, we employ the ST (2010) stochastic
dominance eﬃciency analysis to test whether a use of equally-weighted risk in
each sub-category is eﬃcient or any alternative weighting can assign a higher
risk environment for emerging markets.
6Even though some variables for some countries are nonstationary when these vari-
ables are put into an index and are cointegrated, then their linear combination, the
index, is stationary. In the current application, we use the indices for all emerging
markets to measure the overall risk for all the countries under consideration rather
than individual variables or variables for given countries alone. Therefore, for the
purpose of the present application, we test for stationarity of the overall risk factor
indices in each category.
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4.3 Results for the eﬃciency of sovereign risk indices
This section presents our findings of the test for SD1 eﬃciency of each sub-index
(i.e. economic, political, and financial and banking sector). We find that the
arbitrarily weighted risk ratings are not optimal. We compute the weighting
scheme of each respective factor in each sub-index, which oﬀers the riskiest
environment for emerging economies.
We proceed to construct many other hybrid composites λ consisting of the
nine components of economic performance (i.e. budget balance/GDP, current
account/GDP, total external debt/GDP, public debt/GDP, terms of trade, %
in change of GDP, inflation, total debt per capita and eﬀective maturity) that
stochastically dominate the equally weighted risk environment τ , in the first or-
der sense (e.g. for which G(z, τ ;F ) > G(z, λ;F )). There are 450 diﬀerent such
composite λ’s. The first panel in Table 4 summarizes the results. This table
presents the average weights of the 450 hybrid composites that dominate the
equally weighted risk outcomes. It is clear that GDP growth has the greatest
impact with a 52.1% weight. On the other hand, terms of trade and budget bal-
ance/GDP take weights of 31.5% and 15.7% respectively. Total debt per head
and current account balance/GDP have the least impact on economic risk with
weights of 0.5% and 0.2% respectively. The ineﬃciency of the equally-weighted
economic risk index indicates that it is suboptimal. One can see that there are
three major factors that aﬀect the economic risk of emerging market countries.
If a country is experiencing slow or negative growth, a negative budget balance
and/or adverse terms of trade, then a sovereign debt crisis might be triggered.
Real GDP growth and the government budget balance to GDP ratio are tradi-
tional solvency variables which are most commonly used both in the literature
and in the country risk measures assigned by rating services. The important
contribution of terms of trade and its changes in aﬀecting a country’s ability
to generate dollar revenue from exports - and thus to service external dollar
denominated debt - has been extensively recognized in the literature (Bulow
and Rogoﬀ (1989), Mendoza (1995), Chen and Rogoﬀ (2003), Hilscher and Nos-
busch (2010)). Our analysis attaches an insignificant role to current account
balance to GDP ratio, which is often employed as a solvency variable. However,
this economic variable turns out to be of less significance also in some other
studies (see Baek et al. (2005), for example). Finally, debt-to-GDP ratio is
a widely used indicator of a country’s solvency and the probability of default,
which makes our result counter-intuitive. However, the debt level does not shed
much light on the debt service burden if it is not accompanied by data on its
composition, yield and maturity structure. More importantly, debt ratios "may
not be very good measures of even the concept that they are supposed to proxy,
namely, a country’s ability to pay, or solvency" (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2006)). Solvency is intrinsically an intertemporal concept and analyses primar-
ily focusing on the debt-to-GDP ratio fail to capture the complexity of credit
events and the uncertainty in forecasting whether public debt remains on a sus-
tainable path. On one hand, a dynamic measure of sustainable debt should also
take into account the growth rate of GDP, primary surpluses and interest rates
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(Abiad and Ostry (2005)). On the other hand, the contingent claim approach
(see Gapen et al. (2005), Gray et al. (2006), Gray and Malone (2008)), while
providing a new tool for debt sustainability analysis, has stressed the theoretical
weakness and poor predictive power of an accounting ratio like debt-to-GDP,
which is "a static backward-looking indicator" (Gapen et al. (2005)).
Using the same methodology, we construct many other hybrid composites λ
consisting of the 16 components of the political performance (i.e. PERT, FIRT,
PSER, IEER, ACER, SUER, TRER, IDER, GBER, PIER, QBER, ROFL,
CRER, ICER, PRRT, and TSER) that stochastically dominate the equally
weighted risk index τ , in the first order sense (e.g. for which G(z, τ ;F ) >
G(z, λ;F )). There are 493 diﬀerent such composite λ’s. The second panel in
Table 4 summarizes the results. This table presents the average weights of the
493 hybrid composites that dominate the equally weighted risk outcomes. The
most significant political risk factors - in decreasing order - are the level of cor-
ruption, the lack of transparency and fairness of legal system, the institutional
eﬀectiveness, the impact of violent crime, the quality of bureaucracy and the
degree of property rights protection, while external factors play an insignificant
role.
We follow the same analysis for the financial/banking risk assessment. We
can construct many other hybrid composites λ consisting of the nine risk vari-
ables of the financial and banking sector (i.e. banking sector risk, stock market
index, lending interest rate, money market interest rate, loans/assets, increase
in interest and principal arrears, percentage change in M1 and M2) that stochas-
tically dominate the equal weight risk environment τ , in the first order sense. At
every risk level, z, there is always a λ that dominates the equally weighted risk
index τ . The third panel in Table 4 presents the average weights of the 232 hy-
brid composites that dominate the equally weighted financial risk outcomes. We
find that the percentage change in M1 contributes the most for financial risk
with 41.5% followed by banking sector risk, stock market index, loan/assets,
and the percentage change in M2 with average weights of 34.4%, 16%, 4.6% and
3.5% respectively. As for the financial index, our outcome is that the driving
factor is the percentage change in M1, which is the classical measure of liquidity
of a country. Indeed, a country might be capable of repaying its long term debt,
but might not have the cash to make a payment: in the absence of intervention
by the oﬃcial institutions or in the impossibility of rolling over existing debt,
lack of liquidity will trigger default.
Finally, we find the weighting scheme of each risk factor for the economic,
political and financial environment which oﬀers the riskiest environment for each
respective index. At this point, we follow a similar approach as in each sub-
index (i.e. economic, political and financial risk) to obtain the overall riskiest
environment for emerging economies. To do so, we first obtain the economic,
political and financial risk outcomes for each emerging country over time by
using the weighting schemes proposed in Table 4 for each respective index.
There are 19 countries that have overlapping risk outcomes for each sub-index
with a total of 214 observations for the years between 1997 to 2008. We obtain
the equally-weighted risk outcome for each country by averaging risk levels in
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economic, political and financial indices and test whether the equally-weighted
overall risk index, τ , is eﬃcient or not. We find that we can construct many other
hybrid composite risk indices λ consisting of the 3 sub-index risk outcomes (i.e.
economic, political and financial risk outcomes) that stochastically dominate
the equally-weighted risk index, τ , in the first order sense. Table 5 presents
the average weights of the 190 hybrid composites that dominate the equally-
weighted overall risk index. The results show that financial risk is the main
contributor to sovereign risk in emerging markets with a 77.4% weight, followed
by economic and political risk with a 14.8% and 7.8% weight, respectively. A
spreadsheet to compute the sovereign risk indices for each country is available
at: http://www.unibo.it/docenti/elettra.agliardi/countryrisk.
Our findings on the prevailing role of financial over economic and political
indicators in assessing country risk is in line with the literature showing that the
country risk premium in emerging markets is left unexplained if only changes
in economic fundamentals are considered (Eichengreen and Mody (1998)) and
that market attitude toward risk has a large impact on emerging market bond
spreads (Min (1998), Baek et al. (2005)). As Baek et al. (2005) emphasize
"the divergence between traditional gauges of country risk that are primarily
based on the economic fundamentals of a country and the market-assessed risk
premium is perhaps a result of changes in the general market mood towards
risk in emerging countries". Our analysis, which employs also very recent data,
is able to capture the growing development of the financial sector in emerging
countries and the primary role of monetary policy and of international monetary
institutions as key determinants of sovereign risk.
In the next subsection, we will present some ranking analysis with our opti-
mal risk outcomes for each sub-index and overall risk for emerging countries and
compare our optimal indices’ rankings with the rankings of the rating agencies.
4.4 Analysis with optimal risk indices
In this section we first construct the country rankings using the optimal eco-
nomic and political risk index, from riskiest to the least risky country for 2008,
2009 and 2010. The financial and banking sector and overall country risk rank-
ings are presented for 2008 alone, since some data on the financial sector after
2008 are lacking. Table 6 presents the country risk rankings for each respective
risk index. In the first panel of Table 6 economic risk rankings are oﬀered for the
years 2008, 2009 and 2010. In 2008, the riskiest emerging country in economic
terms is Pakistan, followed by Hungary, Turkey, Thailand and Mexico. In 2009,
except for Pakistan which moved to a lower risk ranking, the countries that had
the riskiest economic environment in 2008 remained the riskiest in economic
terms. Pakistan experienced better growth and improved terms of trade and
had less of a negative budget balance in 2009 than in 2008. Other emerging
countries that have higher economic risk outcomes in 2009 than in 2008 ex-
perienced at least a deterioration either in their economic growth or terms of
trade and/or have a worse budget balance/GDP. In 2010, Hungary, Turkey and
Thailand continued to be in a higher economic risk category, while Pakistan
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returned back to a higher economic risk environment. Overall risk outcomes
in 2010 declined with respect to 2009 with the exception of Pakistan. After
the 1998 default episode Pakistan reached debt rescheduling on extremely fa-
vorable terms. The government pursued macroeconomic stabilization and IMF
intervened with a Stand-by-Arrangement of 7.6 billion $ in November 2008 and
more recently. But on the political side, the internal situation remains critical
and tense. As for the financial and banking sector, while Pakistan’s banks are
considered to be well-capitalized, on the other hand they are heavily exposed to
the government sector, which makes them vulnerable to sovereign shocks, like a
natural disaster. This was the case with the recent floods that put pressure on
the country’s bank system and posed significant risks to the financial sector.
Once the global economic and financial crises took place in late 2008, the
majority of emerging countries experienced a downturn (recession) in their eco-
nomic outcomes in 2009 and had higher risk outcomes in 2009. However, there
was an improvement in 2010 and their economic risk levels declined, with the ex-
ception of Pakistan. When we consider the least risky emerging country, Nigeria
was the country which ranked as the least risky emerging country in economic
terms, followed by China and Chile.
In the second panel of Table 6, we present the political risk rankings for
emerging economies in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Emerging countries which have
the riskiest political environment remained more or less stable over time with
Nigeria, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Ecuador being the top five
politically risky countries over time. Note that Nigeria was the least risky
country in economic terms, yet the riskiest in political terms. On the other hand,
Chile, Malaysia, Hungary, Poland and South Africa are the least risky countries
over time. It is worth noting that Chile is not only among the least risky
countries in political terms but also in economic terms. Chile has benefited from
the recent liberalization policy and trade openness promoted by its government,
registering an increase in exports and a rise in income levels and consumer
demand.
In the third panel of Table 6, we present the financial risk rankings for
emerging economies in 2008, with Hungary, China and Ukraine being the riskiest
countries and Poland, Mexico and Chile being the least risky ones in financial
and banking sector terms. At the end of 2008 Hungary was indeed perceived
as a very risky country and was attributed a negative watch by the rating
agencies. Also Ukraine’s vulnerability exacerbated in 2008 and was reflected in
the devaluation of the national currency (almost 60% devaluation of Ukrainian
hryvnya against US$ in 4th quarter 2008) which was detrimental to retail lending
and dramatically aﬀected the country’s bank sector. In 2008 Ukraine’s current
account deficit increased, the macroeconomic indicators deteriorated and credit
default swaps traded above 1000 bps. At the beginning of 2010 total assets of
Ukrainian banking systems contracted by 30% compared to the 2008 pre-crisis
level. After the approval of the stand-by arrangement by IMF, giving Ukraine
immediate access to $ 2 billion of financing, a rating upgrade occurred in 2010.
The high value of the financial risk index for China is in contrast with the risk
assessment of the big rating agencies and the prevailing common wisdom, but is
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in line with the data on the problems that are lurking on China’s bank balance
sheets – in particular, the losses that may be incurred from loans made to
development entities ( LGFVs) that are sponsored and supposedly guaranteed
by provincial and local governments. According to some analysts at Bank of
America-Merrill Lynch 23% of these loans are categorized as “facing high credit
risks” and they might cause some 30% cut to bank earnings. While these lending
category alarmed the Chinese government, there are other categories – loans to
property developers, to industries with significant overcapacity, to overextended
home buyers, to businesses that diverted the funds to stock and real estate
speculation – that may expose Chinese banks to significant losses.
Finally, the fourth panel of Table 6 presents the overall risk in emerging
countries. This is highly correlated with financial risk outcomes, since the main
contributor to sovereign risk is driven by the financial and banking sectors. For
overall risk, Hungary is the riskiest country in 2008 since it is the riskiest country
in financial terms and second riskiest country in economic terms. Even though
politically Hungary ranks a lower position, financial and economic risk environ-
ments are the main contributors to overall risk. Pakistan moved to a higher
ranking in the ladder, since not only it has a high financial risk environment
but also a high risk environment in economic terms.
We further consider whether our optimal sovereign risk rankings are signif-
icantly correlated or not with the rating agencies’ rankings. The first panel of
Table 7 presents the country rating rankings of S&P and Fitch from the riskiest
to least risky outcome for 2008, while the second panel of Table 7 presents the
country rating rankings of the S&P from the riskiest to the least risky outcome
in 2009 and 2010. We analyze whether there is a significant Spearman rank
correlation between the rating agencies’ rankings and our optimal risk rankings
in each sub-index and whether changes in the S&P ratings over time are similar
to the changes using the optimal risk sub-indices.
Firstly, we show that the rating institutions’ rankings are highly correlated,
since we find the Spearman correlation coeﬃcient between the S&P and Fitch
rankings to be 0.99. Table 8 presents the Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcients
between the rating companies’ rankings and our optimal sub-index rankings.
In the first panel of Table 8, we report the Spearman correlation coeﬃcient
between the S&P rankings and the optimal economic, political, financial and
overall risk rankings. There are 19 countries which have overlapping data for all
optimal indices among the 32 emerging countries. We find that only our political
rankings are positively correlated with the S&P rankings at the 5% significance
level. However, we find no significant correlation between the optimal economic,
financial and overall risk rankings and the S&P ratings. In the second panel of
Table 8, we compute the Spearman coeﬃcient between the S&P rankings and
each optimal risk index ranking separately in order to use more countries for the
analysis. The results are similar to those of the correlation coeﬃcients with the
19 common countries. In the third and fourth panels of Table 8 the same analysis
is done for the Fitch rating rankings. We consider the 18 countries which have
overlapping data for all optimal risk indices. The findings are slightly diﬀerent
from those of the S&P ratings.
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We also examine the changes in the risk environment for the period 2008 to
2010 that covers much of the current global economic and financial crisis. The
first panel of Table 7 presents the emerging countries’ risk ratings by the S&P
for 2008 and the second panel of Table 7 for 2009 and 2010. Rating agencies,
such as S&P, generally produce stable ratings even in the outbreak of a global
economic and financial crisis. The overall stability of rating is striking: for 17 out
of a total 30 emerging countries, S&P gave the same ratings in 2008 and 2009,
for 7 countries the ratings changed slightly and for only 6 countries were there
significant changes in ratings in 2009 relative to 20087. Furthermore, changes
in the S&P country ratings are more stable going from 2009 to 2010 than from
2008 to 2009 as for 25 of 30 emerging countries the ratings in 2010 remained the
same as those of 20098. The overall stability of ratings is confirmed by various
works (Gaillard (2007), Sy (2001)) investigating the correlation between the
agencies’ ratings and their agreement/disagreements with the market’s view.
It is stressed that the ratings from S&P, Fitch - and even more Moody’s -
remain unchanged after excessively high or low spreads, in many cases, and the
relationship between rating and market spreads is weaker in times of market
turbulence (see Ferri et al. (1999), who showed that S&P and Moody’s failed
to predict the Asian crisis and even exacerbated it because of their alleged pro-
cyclical ratings). Another feature of the agencies’ sovereign ratings is that the
few rating changes are usually asymmetric. The three main agencies are more
reluctant to upgrade when spreads are excessively low than downgrade when
spreads are excessively high, showing an asymmetric trend that is stronger for
the Fitch and Moody’s than for S&P. Our indices are not aﬀected by such biased
behavior. As an illustration we compare the performance of our risk index with
the S&P and Fitch ratings in the case of Argentina’s sovereign default (see
Figure 2). The agencies’ ratings are mapped to a 0-100 scale and all the risk
values are considered at the beginning of each year to allow for a comparison.
Argentina defaulted on Jan. 3, 2002 and the bank rush started at the end of
2001. Our index provides an earlier warning than S&P and Fitch that rated
BB- at the beginning of 2001. S&P rated SD only on Nov. 6, 2001 and Fitch
rated DDD only on Dec. 3, 2001, while our index started moving upwards in
the years preceding the default episodes.
With our optimal indices, we find that the changes in economic risk for
emerging countries were dramatically diﬀerent than those of the S&P ratings.
Almost all emerging countries’ economic condition deteriorated from 2009 with
the exception of Pakistan. Only 5 emerging countries have similar changes in our
optimal economic risk index with respect to the changes in the S&P ratings from
2008 to 2009. Pakistan’s risk rating improved from 2008 to 2009 and Hungary,
Mexico, Nigeria, and Ukraine’s economic conditions deteriorated. From 2009 to
2010, only 3 countries have significant improvement in the S&P ratings, whereas
7Ecuador and Pakistan have major improvements in their ratings, SD to CCC+ and CCC+
to B- respectively. Hungary, Mexico, Nigeria and Ukraine have major deterioration in their
ratings (BBB to BBB-, BBB+ to BBB, BB- to B+, and B to CCC+ respectively).
8 Indonesia, Turkey and Ukraine have major improvements in their ratings, BB- to BB,
BB- to BB, and CCC+ to B- respectively.
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with the optimal economic risk index, all countries except Pakistan improved
their conditions.
One reason why the rankings obtained with the optimal indices diﬀer sig-
nificantly from the rankings of the S&P ratings is the following. In the S&P
rating, some major risks can be hidden when the overall risk is aggregated with
pre-assigned weights, as in that case one weakness of a country can cancel out
with another strength of the same country. As a result, rankings obtained with
the optimal risk indices (i.e., capturing the riskiest variables for all emerging
markets) produce major rank reversals when compared with the S&P ratings
(i.e., capturing an average perception of risk with the pre-assigned weights). In
this case, an emerging country may have an average risk assignment with S&P
ratings (e.g., Hungary) but may have a higher risk with the optimal indices
that capture the common weaknesses of all emerging markets. In this case, our
risk indices are not correlated with the S&P ratings and are more prone to cap-
ture the riskiest variables in each sub-index. Table 9 oﬀers the detailed relative
ranking diﬀerences between the optimal overall risk and the S&P ratings for
2008. There exist major relative rank reversals such as Hungary, whereas Thai-
land and China are relatively riskier with the optimal overall risk index when
compared with the S&P ratings. On the other hand, Nigeria and Turkey are
relatively less risky when compared with the S&P rankings. Overall, for most
countries we notice a change in their relative rankings when we compare the
optimal risk index with the S&P rankings.
Overall, although rating companies do not employ exact formulas for com-
bining the scores to determine ratings and the weights are not optimally chosen,
either across the sovereigns or over time, they arrive at rankings that are cor-
related with our optimal political risk index. However, rating agencies assign
ratings to emerging countries that are mostly stable over time and they often
change their ratings after the market’s view in times of severe deterioration
and/or improvement of sovereign creditworthiness.
Finally, we consider whether our optimal sovereign risk rankings are signif-
icantly correlated or not with the sovereign bond interest rate spreads, annual
basis points over US Treasuries. Table 10 presents the Spearman rank cor-
relation coeﬃcients between the sovereign bond interest rate spreads and our
optimal sub-index rankings. In the first panel of Table 10 we report the Spear-
man correlation coeﬃcient between the sovereign bond interest rate spreads
and the optimal economic, political, financial and overall risk. There are 17
countries which have overlapping data for all optimal indices among the 32
emerging countries. We find that our financial and overall risk indices are posi-
tively correlated with the sovereign bond interest rate spreads in 2008 at the 5%
significance level. In the second panel of Table 10, we compute the Spearman
coeﬃcient between the sovereign bond interest rate spreads and each optimal
risk index ranking separately in order to use more countries for the analysis. The
results are similar to those of the correlation coeﬃcients with the 17 common
countries. Our political risk index is positively correlated with the sovereign
bond interest rate spreads at the 10% significance level when more countries
are used for the analysis.
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In conclusion, although our analysis employed annual data, still it is able to
capture a large part of the information released by the sovereign bond spreads.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses stochastic dominance eﬃciency tests at any order for time de-
pendent data. We study tests for stochastic dominance eﬃciency of a given
index with respect to all possible indices constructed from a set of individual
components. We proceed to test whether stochastic dominance eﬃciency justi-
fies the use of the arbitrarily-weighted risk indices obtained by rating agencies
for the sovereign risk assessment: economic, political and financial risks. The
results from the empirical analysis indicate that equally weighting risk factors
in each sub-index does not produce an optimal index in the SD eﬃciency sense.
We can construct many alternative indices that dominate the equally weighted
sub-index risk value and assign a riskier environment to each emerging market
country. Moreover, we construct an overall risk index and the results show that
the financial risk is the main contributor to the overall sovereign risk environ-
ment in emerging markets followed by economic and political risk.
The implications of these results are important. We propose the riskiest
factors in economic, political and financial terms for emerging countries. Higher
sovereign risk among emerging markets over time can be mainly attributed
to financial factors and as such reducing overall risk for a particular country
would imply improvements of this country’s financial institutions. Secondly, an
emerging market country should have high growth rates, export more and have
a positive budget balance to be less subject to economic risk; decrease the level
of corruption, have fair legal systems and improve its institutional eﬀectiveness
in order to reach a better political environment; increase liquidity and decrease
banking sector risk to achieve a better financial institutional environment. We
should mention that the upper and lower bounds of each index may change over
time; therefore, we should mention that the weighting scheme assigned to each
index may change over time. Moreover, there may be a major improvement
and/or deterioration of risk factors in each sub-index over time for emerging
countries. Furthermore, one may expect that there may be some other risk fac-
tors found to be important in the future not captured in the current analysis.
Since the optimal weighting scheme in the construction of the each sub-index
changes i) as the bounds change, ii) if there is major improvement or deterio-
ration of some risk factors for emerging countries and iii) with the inclusion of
some other risk factors in the analysis, the stochastic dominance eﬃciency of
the optimal risk indices should be tested periodically.
As a further research, one could employ other consistent SD pairwise tests,
like in Linton et al. (2005) and Gonzalo and Olmo (2010), to determine whether
one year has riskier outcomes than another year and/or whether some risk in-
dicators are riskier than others in a given year using a pairwise comparison. It
is also possible to determine the riskiest time periods for emerging markets and
further analyze the main factors that precipitated this high risk environment.
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Another possible extension is to employ SD eﬃciency tests to analyze shorter
span data to obtain optimal weights in order to refine the forecast of future
sovereign crises. Finally, our methodology could be fruitfully applied to other
group of countries, and in particular to mature economies where the risk of
sovereign debt crises has increased dramatically.
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6 Appendix A: Simulating p-values
6.1 Block Bootstrap Methods
Block bootstrap methods extend the nonparametric i.i.d. bootstrap to a time
series context (see Barrett and Donald (2003) and Abadie (2002) for use of
the nonparametric i.i.d. bootstrap in stochastic dominance tests). They are
based on “blocking” arguments, in which data are divided into blocks and those,
rather than individual data, are resampled in order to mimic the time dependent
structure of the original data. We focus on the block bootstrap since we face
moderate sample sizes in the empirical applications, and wish to exploit the full
sample information.
Let b, l denote integers such that T = bl. The non-overlapping rule (Carl-
stein (1986)) just asks the data to be divided into b disjoint blocks, the k-th be-
ing Bk = (Y
0
(k−1)l+1, ...,Y
0
kl)
0 with k ∈ {1, ..., b}. The block bootstrap method
requires that we choose blocks B∗1, ...,B
∗
b by resampling randomly, with replace-
ment, from the set of non-overlapping blocks. If B∗i = (Y
∗0
i1, ...,Y
∗0
il )
0, a block
bootstrap sample {Y ∗t ; t = 1, ..., T} is made of {Y ∗11, ...,Y ∗1l,Y ∗21, ...,Y ∗2l, ...,
Y ∗b1, ...,Y
∗
bl} and we let Fˆ ∗ denote its empirical distribution.
Let us define p∗j := P [S
∗
j > Sˆj ], where S
∗
j is the test statistic corresponding
to each bootstrap sample. Then the block bootstrap method is justified by the
next statement (the proof is given by ST (2010)).
Proposition 1 Assuming that α < 1/2, a test for SDEj based on the rule:
“ rejectHj0 if p
∗
j < α ”,
satisfies the following
limP [rejectHj0 ] ≤ α ifH
j
0 is true,
limP [rejectHj0 ] = 1 ifH
j
0 is false.
In practice we need to use Monte Carlo methods to approximate the prob-
ability. The p-value is simply approximated by p˜j =
1
R
RX
r=1
I{S˜j,r > Sˆj}, where
the averaging is made on R replications. The replication number can be chosen
to make the approximations as accurate as we desire given time and computer
constraints.
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INDEX Methodology  
ICRG 3 sub-indices P, F, E and a composite index C.  
Political risk index P (based on 100 points), financial  risk (based on 
50 points) and economic  risk E (based on 50 points). 
 
C= (P+F+E)/2 
 
The composite index ranges from 0 to 100: the interval 0-49.9 
corresponds to very high risk, the interval 80-100 to very low risk. 
http://www.prsgroup.com 
 
II Country creditworthiness scores are based on ratings provided by a 
survey of leading international bankers who are asked to grade each 
of the countries on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the 
least creditworthy country. The answers are weighted following an 
unpublished formula that "properly gives more weights to responses 
from banks with the largest worldwide exposure and the most 
sophisticated country analysis systems". 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com 
 
Euromoney A panel of several leading experts (economists and political 
analysts) are asked to rate each country for which they have 
knowledge. The credit rating score assigned to each country is a 
weighted average of seven indicators: political risk (30%), 
economic performance (30%), access to bank finance/capital 
markets (10%), discount on forfeiting (10%), credit ratings (7.5%) 
assigned from the major rating agencies, debt indicators (7.5%) and 
debt in default or rescheduled (5%) calculated from the World 
Bank's Global Development Finance figures. 
http://www.euromoneycountryrisk.com 
 
EIU Based on 7-year historical data sequence, it considers a large set of 
variables (e.g. current account balance, financial requirements, 
foreign reserves, short-term debt, vulnerability of the banking 
sector)  for a large set of countries and, in particular, emerging and 
highly indebted countries. 
http://www.eiu.com 
 
BERI It employs structured qualitative methods, i.e.,  standardized formats 
with specifically stipulated scope and focus of analysis across 
countries. Three main determinants: business climate, political 
stability, currency and repayment risk. Two risk indices are 
calculated three times a year: ORI (operations risk index) and PRI 
(political risk index). A great emphasis is given to PRI, whose main 
components are linguistic/ethnic/religious tensions, corruption, 
nepotism, social conditions, social conflict, income distribution, 
history of regime instability, etc. 
http://www.beri.com 
 
 
 
 
                                              Figure 1: Country risk indices 
 
 
                         Figure  2: Sovereign risk index for Argentina 
Table 1 
Data descriptions and sources  
 
Variable Definition and/or sources  
Economic risk factors  
Budget balance  
(% of GDP) 
Central government receipts minus central government outlays, as a percentage of GDP.  
Derived from National sources. 
Current Account  
Balance/GDP 
Current-account balance as a percentage of GDP. Derived from lines 78ald and 99b in the IFS. 
Total Debt/GDP Total external debt at end-period as a percentage of nominal GDP. Derived from IFS. 
Public Debt (% of GDP) Total debt after consolidation (both local and foreign currency) owed by central government to 
domestic residents, foreign nationals and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Terms of trade (1990=100) Ratio of the export price index to the import price index (1990=100). Derived from IFS. 
GDP (% real change) Percentage change in real GDP, over previous year. 
Consumer prices  
 (% change) 
Percentage change in consumer price index in local currency (period average), over previous year. 
 
Total debt per head Total external debt divided by population (line 99z in the IFS). 
Effective maturity Total medium- and long-term debt in the previous year divided by medium- and long-term 
principal repayments paid for the current year expressed in years. 
Political risk factors  
EIU political environment 
rating (PERT) 
The political environment rating scores countries between 1 and 10 on political stability and 
institutional effectiveness, with 1 being low and 10 being high. 
EIU policy environment for 
foreign investment rating 
(FIRT) 
The EIU's policy towards foreign investment rating scores countries between 1 and 10 on a variety 
of measures including government policy and the risk of expropriation, with 1 being low and 10 
being high. 
EIU political stability 
rating (PSER) 
The political stability rating scores countries between 1 and 10, with 1 being low and 10 being 
high. 
EIU institutional 
effectiveness rating (IEER) 
The institutional effectiveness rating scores countries between 1 and 10, with 1 being low and 10 
being high. 
Risk of armed conflict 
(ACER) 
The risk of armed conflict rating scores countries between 1 and 5, with 1 being very high and 5 
being very low. 
Risk of social unrest 
(SUER) 
The risk of social unrest rating scores countries between 1 and 5, with 1 being very high and 5 
being very low. 
Terrorism threat (TRER) The EIU's terrorism threat rating scores countries between 1 and 5 on the terrorist threat to 
government and business, with 1 being very high and 5 being no threat. 
International disputes and 
tensions (IDER) 
The EIU's international disputes and tensions rating scores countries between 1 and 5 on the threat 
posed by international disputes to the economy and polity, with 1 being very high and 5 being no 
threat. 
Government stance towards 
business (GBER) 
The EIU's government stance towards business rating scores countries between 1 and 5 on the 
likelihood that the current government will implement open, liberal, and pro-business policies, 
with 1 being very low and 5 being very high. 
Effectiveness of system in 
policy implementation 
(PIER) 
The EIU's business environment rankings quantify the attractiveness of the business environment. 
The effectiveness of policy implementation and execution rating scores countries between 1 and 5, 
with 1 being very low and 5 being very high. 
Quality of bureaucracy 
(QBER) 
The EIU's business environment rankings quantify the attractiveness of the business environment. 
The quality of bureaucracy rating scores countries between 1 and 5, with 1 being very low and 5 
being very high. 
Transparency and fairness 
of legal system (ROFL) 
The EIU's government stance towards business rating scores countries between 1 and 5 on the 
transparency and fairness of legal system, with 1 being very low/unfair and 5 being very high/fair. 
Level of corruption 
(CRER) 
The EIU's corruption rating scores countries between 1 and 5 on the pervasiveness of corruption 
among public officials, with 1 being very high and 5 being very low. 
Impact of crime (ICER) The EIU's impact of crime rating scores countries between 1 and 5 on whether violent crime is a 
problem for government and business, with 1 being strongly yes and 5 being strongly no. 
Degree of property rights 
protection (PRRT) 
The EIU's business environment rankings quantify the attractiveness of the business environment. 
The degree of property rights protection rating scores countries between 1 and 5, with 1 being very 
low and 5 being very high. 
Fairness of tax system 
(TSER) 
The EIU's business environment rankings quantify the attractiveness of the business environment. 
The fairness of tax system rating scores countries between 1 and 5, with 1 being very low and 5 
being very high. 
 Table 1 (continued) 
 
Variable Definition and/or sources  
Financial risk factors  
Banking Sector risk The EIU's banking sector risk rakings quantify a score given to assess whether there are likely to 
be payment problems within the banking sector. The banking sector risk scores countries between 
0 and 100, with 0 being very low and 100 being very high. 
Stock market index Composite stock market index (12/31/92=100) in local currency. 
Lending interest rate Commercial banks average lending rate to non-financial enterprises (all loans exc current 
accounts) 
Money market interest rate Weighted average yield on 13 week Treasury bills. 
Loans/assets This liquidity ratio indicates what percentage of the assets of the bank are tied up in loans. The 
higher this ratio the less liquid the banking system will be. 
Increase in interest arrears 
(if any) 
Change in cumulative stock of unpaid interest charges due on long-term external debt at end-
period. 
Increase in principal arrears 
(if any) 
Change in cumulative stock of overdue principal repayments on long-term external debt at end-
period. 
Percentage change in M1 Percentage change in total supply of notes and coins plus demand deposits at end-period, over 
previous year. Derived from line 34 in IFS 
Percentage change in M2 Percentage change in M1 plus quasi-money at end-period, over previous year. Derived directly 
from lines 34 and 35 in IFS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2A  
Data and Descriptive Statistics (Normalized to unit range) 
 
Normalized economic risk factors 
 Budget 
Balance 
 (% of GDP) 
Current 
Account 
Balance/GDP 
Total 
Debt/GDP 
Public Debt 
(% of GDP) 
Terms of 
Trade 
(1990=100) 
GDP  
(% real 
change) 
Consumer 
prices  
(% change) 
Total Debt 
per head 
Effective 
Maturity 
Mean 0.475 0.429 0.284 0.142 0.814 0.456 0.060 0.084 0.142 
Median 0.467 0.445 0.259 0.134 0.840 0.434 0.048 0.063 0.093 
Std. Dev. 0.139 0.134 0.175 0.091 0.127 0.143 0.063 0.109 0.139 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
Normalized political risk factors 
 PERT FIRT PSER IIER ACER SUER TRER IDER GBER PIER QBER ROFL CRER ICER PRRT TSER 
Mean 0.519 0.415 0.440 0.572 0.338 0.484 0.339 0.374 0.376 0.467 0.549 0.592 0.631 0.460 0.356 0.534 
Median 0.53 0.40 0.45 0.58 0.4 0.52 0.24 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 
Std.Dv. 0.117 0.160 0.139 0.116 0.194 0.170 0.184 0.156 0.132 0.133 0.163 0.158 0.155 0.159 0.196 0.152 
Min 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.22 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.2 
Max 0.82 0.82 0.76 0.82 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
 
 
Normalized financial risk factors 
 Banking 
Sector Risk 
Stock 
market 
index 
Lending 
interest rate 
Money 
market 
interest rate 
Loans/ 
Assets 
Increase in 
interest 
arrears 
Increase in 
principal 
arrears 
Percentage 
change in 
M1 
Percentage 
change in 
M2 
Mean 0.5468 0.6665 0.1668 0.1073 0.4204 0.0213 0.0217 0.7156 0.6190 
Median 0.5385 0.7835 0.1032 0.0692 0.4393 0 0 0.7399 0.6467 
Std. Dev. 0.2148 0.3288 0.1891 0.1328 0.1716 0.1038 0.1253 0.1140 0.1341 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
Table 2B 
 Data and Descriptive Statistics (Before normalization to unit range) 
 
 
Economic risk factors 
 Budget 
Balance 
 (% of GDP) 
Current 
Account 
Balance/GDP 
Total 
Debt/GDP 
Public Debt 
(% of GDP) 
Terms of 
Trade 
(1990=100) 
GDP  
(% real 
change) 
Consumer 
prices  
(% change) 
Total Debt 
per head 
Effective 
Maturity 
Mean -2.585 -0.518 42.201 46.406 114.692 3.952 20.563 0.001 11.342 
Median -2.401 -1.204 38.729 43.853 103.967 4.663 7.461 0.001 7.8 
Std. Dev. 3.344 5.794 25.133 26.96 53.925 4.481 69.933 0.002 9.867 
Min -15.211 -25.2 1.587 4.108 36.025 -13.128 -45.511 0.000 1.212 
Max 8.819 18.035 144.844 301.531 459.6 18.287 1058.374 0.017 72.337 
 
 
Political risk factors 
 PERT FIRT PSER IIER ACER SUER TRER IDER GBER PIER QBER ROFL CRER ICER PRRT TSER 
Mean 4.808 5.846 5.601 4.278 3.312 2.583 3.304 3.132 3.119 2.665 2.255 2.039 1.844 2.701 3.218 2.329 
Median 4.7 6 5.5 4.2 3 2.4 3.8 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 
Std.Dv. 1.172 1.598 1.388 1.157 0.971 0.851 0.919 0.779 0.658 0.664 0.816 0.791 0.775 0.794 0.980 0.758 
Min 1.8 1.8 2.4 1.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 8 9.6 8.7 7.8 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 
 
 
Financial risk factors 
 Banking Sector 
Risk 
Lending 
interest rate 
Money market 
interest rate 
Loans/ Assets Increase in 
interest arrears 
Increase in 
principal 
arrears 
Percentage 
change in M1 
Percentage 
change in M2 
Mean 52.431 18.736 10.936 50.399 146.364 213.492 21.389 20.393 
Median 52 12.92 7.504 51.845 0 0 17.026 16.751 
Std. Dev. 11.169 17.307 12.046 13.092 711.656 1232.88 20.474 17.683 
Min 24 3.47 1.229 18.318 0 0 -29.674 -29.824 
Max 76 95 91.954 94.634 6855.7 9840.9 149.852 101.991 
Note: Stock market index is in local currency; therefore, descriptive statistics of this variable is not given. 
 
Table 3 
Unit root tests 
Economic Risk Indices Index levels (SBIC) Index levels (AIC) Index levels (HQIC) 
Budget Balance -4.024* -4.024* -4.024* 
Current Account Balance -22.036* -4.767* -6.038* 
Total Debt -23.311* -3.729 -4.024* 
Public Debt -20.105* -4.073* -4.423* 
Terms of Trade -3.158** -3.158** -3.158** 
GDP -4.463* -4.463* -4.463* 
Consumer Prices -19.382* -14.083* -14.083* 
Total Debt per capita -6.190* -5.285* -6.190* 
Effective Maturity -21.892* -9.411* -21.892* 
Political Risk Indices    
PERT -7.225* -6.389* -6.299* 
FIRT -6.303* -6.303* -6.303* 
PSER -7.445* -7.445* -7.445* 
ACER -9.757* -9.757* -9.757* 
SUER -13.321* -7.581* -13.321* 
TRER -6.358* -6.357* -6.358* 
IDER -11.481* -11.481* -11.481* 
IEER -11.090* -9.621* -9.621* 
GBER -11.794* -11.794* -11.794* 
PIER -6.162* -6.162* -6.162* 
QBER -8.341* -8.341* -8.341* 
ROFL -13.830* -13.830* -13.830* 
CRER -11.624* -11.624* -11.624* 
ICER -5.838* -5.838* -5.838* 
PRRT -9.672* -9.696* -9.672* 
TSER -6.414* -6.414* -6.414* 
Financial Risk Indices    
Banking Sector -5.773* -4.265* -5.773* 
Stock Market -9.331* -6.772* -8.003* 
Lending interest rate -14.965* -4.987* -4.692* 
Money market interest rate -6.279* -5.303* -5.303* 
Loan/Assets -15.886* -9.482* -9.482* 
Increase in interest arrears -15.767* -15.767* -15.767* 
Increase in principal arrears -15.540* -15.540* -15.540* 
Change in M1 -14.601* -14.601* -14.601* 
Change in M2 -16.363* -16.363* -16.363* 
Notes: Critical values of ADF are 1% (–3.44) and 5% (–2.86), respectively, taken from MacKinnon (1991). 
ADF lag length decision based on Schwartz information criterion (SBIC), Akaike's information criterion 
(AIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) (minimum lag = 0 and maximum lag = 10). 
*, and ** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% level of rejecting the unit root process. The null hypothesis is 
that the variable suggests a unit root process and the alternative is that the variable is generated by a 
stationary process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Stochastic efficient weighting for economic, political and financial risk 
 
 
Stochastic efficient weighting for economic risk  
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
dominating 
weighting 
scheme 
Budget 
Balance 
(% of 
GDP) 
Current 
Account 
Balance/GDP 
Total 
Debt/GDP 
Public 
Debt 
(% of 
GDP) 
Terms of 
Trade 
(1990=100) 
GDP  
(% real 
change) 
Consumer 
prices  
(% 
change) 
Total 
Debt 
per 
head 
Effective 
Maturity 
N n Average of dominating weighting schemes 
454 450 0.157 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.315 0.521 0.000 0.005 0.000 
Note: 24 emerging market countries for the period from 1980 to 2010 are analyzed (unbalanced data set). All variables are normalized by linear scaling and converted 
in a way that all variables’ higher values meaning more risky environment for economic performance. 
 
 
Stochastic efficient weighting for political risk 
PERT FIRT PSER IEER ACER SUER TRER IDER GBER PIER QBER ROFL CRER ICER PRRT TSER 
Average of dominating weighting schemes 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.022 0.332 0.381 0.093 0.013 0.002 
Note: 32 emerging market countries between the period from 1995 to 2010 are analyzed (expect ratings of Azerbaijan captures the period of 1998-2010). 10-scaled rating variables are 
transformed to 5-scale by dividing each rating in 10-scale by 2.  
 
 
Stochastic efficient weighting for financial and banking sector risk 
Number of 
observations 
 
Number of 
dominating 
weighting 
schemes 
Banking 
Sector 
Risk 
Stock 
Market 
Index 
Lending 
interest 
rate 
Money 
market 
interest 
rate 
Loans/ 
Assets 
Increase 
in 
interest 
arrears 
Increase 
in 
principal 
arrears 
% 
change 
in M1 
% 
change 
in M2 
N n Average of dominating weighting schemes 
232 232 0.344 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.415 0.035 
Note: 22 emerging market countries for the period from 1997 to 2008 are studied. All variables are normalized by unit range and converted in a way that 
all variables’ higher values meaning more risky environment for financial and banking sector. 
 
 
 
 Table 5 
Stochastic efficient weighting for each sub-index for overall risk  
 
 
Stochastic efficient weighting for each sub-index 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
dominating 
weighting schemes 
 
Economic Risk 
 
Political Risk 
Financial and 
Banking Sector 
Risk 
N n Average of dominating weighting schemes 
214 190 0.148 0.078 0.774 
Note: 19 countries have overlapping data set for each sub-index with 214 observations between years 1997 to 2008. Weights for 
each economic factor in the first panel of table 3 are used to construct the economic performance risk outcomes. Weights for each 
political factor in the second panel of table 3 are used to construct the political risk outcomes. Weights for each financial and 
banking sector factor in the third panel of table 3 are used to construct the financial and banking sector outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Rankings of emerging market countries for economic, political, financial and banking risk and overall risk 
 
 
Economic risk rankings in 2008, 2009, and 2010 
Country 2008 Country 2009 Country 2010 
Pakistan 0.6798 Mexico 0.7800 Hungary 0.6829 
Hungary 0.6560 Turkey 0.7728 Ecuador 0.6633 
Turkey 0.6341 Hungary 0.7717 Turkey 0.6442 
Thailand 0.6104 Thailand 0.7568 Pakistan 0.6431 
Mexico 0.6006 Russia 0.7531 Thailand 0.6398 
Philippines 0.5752 Malaysia 0.7449 Poland 0.6193 
Malaysia 0.5672 Ecuador 0.7448 Argentina 0.6124 
Vietnam 0.5559 Romania 0.7082 Bulgaria 0.6120 
Poland 0.5525 Bulgaria 0.7014 Malaysia 0.6101 
Colombia 0.5493 Philippines 0.6839 Romania 0.6078 
India 0.5492 Argentina 0.6833 Vietnam 0.5983 
Ecuador 0.5488 Poland 0.6580 Philippines 0.5968 
Indonesia 0.5363 Colombia 0.6370 Mexico 0.5929 
Romania 0.5245 Brazil 0.6360 Indonesia 0.5842 
Brazil 0.5240 Iran 0.6312 Peru 0.5815 
Iran 0.5147 Pakistan 0.6219 Colombia 0.5808 
Bulgaria 0.5116 Vietnam 0.6132 Russia 0.5754 
Argentina 0.4881 Peru 0.6098 Brazil 0.5749 
China 0.4762 Venezuela 0.6065 Venezuela 0.5627 
Russia 0.4383 Indonesia 0.6009 Iran 0.5569 
Peru 0.4368 India 0.5691 India 0.5496 
Chile 0.3723 Chile 0.5134 China 0.5060 
Venezuela 0.3335 China 0.5082 Chile 0.4380 
Nigeria 0.2754 Nigeria 0.4529 Nigeria 0.4096 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
 
Political risk rankings in 2008, 2009, and 2010 
Country 2008 Country 2009 Country 2010 
Nigeria 0.7702 Nigeria 0.7702 Venezuela 0.7688 
Venezuela 0.7456 Venezuela 0.7606 Nigeria 0.7687 
Kazakhstan 0.7316 Kazakhstan 0.7337 Ecuador 0.7342 
Azerbaijan 0.7184 Ecuador 0.7270 Kazakhstan 0.7342 
Ecuador 0.7117 Azerbaijan 0.7200 Azerbaijan 0.7200 
Ukraine 0.6958 Ukraine 0.6953 Ukraine 0.6947 
Russia 0.6845 Russia 0.6822 Russia 0.6795 
China 0.6811 Indonesia 0.6652 Indonesia 0.6652 
Indonesia 0.6637 China 0.6650 China 0.6422 
Iran 0.6442 Iran 0.6423 Iran 0.6401 
Peru 0.6391 Vietnam 0.6314 Vietnam 0.6272 
Vietnam 0.6372 Pakistan 0.6221 Saudi Arabia 0.6219 
Pakistan 0.6337 Saudi Arabia 0.6220 Philippines 0.6049 
Saudi Arabia 0.6221 Peru 0.6203 Pakistan 0.6029 
Algeria 0.6199 Philippines 0.6049 Peru 0.5953 
Philippines 0.6049 Algeria 0.6034 Algeria 0.5803 
Bulgaria 0.5701 Bulgaria 0.5681 Bulgaria 0.5676 
Turkey 0.5575 Turkey 0.5576 Turkey 0.5577 
Thailand 0.5533 Thailand 0.5549 Thailand 0.5549 
Romania 0.5318 Romania 0.5165 Brazil 0.5146 
Colombia 0.5166 Brazil 0.5146 Colombia 0.5119 
Brazil 0.5146 Colombia 0.5142 Mexico 0.5085 
India 0.5145 Mexico 0.5086 Romania 0.5012 
Egypt 0.5110 Argentina 0.4984 Argentina 0.5000 
Mexico 0.5087 India 0.4972 Sri Lanka 0.4955 
Argentina 0.4967 Sri Lanka 0.4961 Egypt 0.4766 
Sri Lanka 0.4966 Egypt 0.4938 India 0.4724 
South Africa 0.4537 South Africa 0.4210 Poland 0.4000 
Poland 0.4013 Poland 0.3999 Hungary 0.3974 
Hungary 0.3982 Hungary 0.3978 South Africa 0.3880 
Malaysia 0.3707 Malaysia 0.3733 Malaysia 0.3775 
Chile 0.2988 Chile 0.2992 Chile 0.3011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
 
Financial and banking risk rankings in 2008 
Country 2008 
Hungary 0.7128 
China 0.6959 
Ukraine 0.6879 
Pakistan 0.6810 
Thailand 0.6786 
Indonesia 0.6681 
Kazakhstan 0.6638 
Argentina 0.6577 
Venezuela 0.6552 
Bulgaria 0.6531 
Philippines 0.6212 
Turkey 0.6100 
India 0.5893 
Brazil 0.5789 
Colombia 0.5663 
Peru 0.5604 
Malaysia 0.5504 
Nigeria 0.5469 
Poland 0.5312 
Mexico 0.4757 
Chile 0.4704 
 
 
Overall risk rankings in 2008 
Country 2008 
Hungary 0.6798 
Pakistan 0.6771 
China 0.6623 
Thailand 0.6588 
Indonesia 0.6483 
Bulgaria 0.6257 
Argentina 0.6200 
Venezuela 0.6146 
Philippines 0.6131 
Turkey 0.6095 
India 0.5775 
Brazil 0.5658 
Colombia 0.5599 
Peru 0.5482 
Malaysia 0.5389 
Poland 0.5242 
Nigeria 0.5241 
Mexico 0.4967 
Chile 0.4425 
Table 7  
Country rating rankings of the S&P and FITCH 
 
S&P Rankings in 2008  FITCH Rankings in 2008 
Country S&P Rating S&P Mapping Rank Country FITCH Rating FITCH Mapping 
Ecuador SD 1 1 Argentina RD 0.99 
Pakistan  CCC+ (developing) 0.8 2 Ecuador RD 0.99 
Argentina B- (stable) 0.75 3 Ukraine B+ (negative) 0.66 
Ukraine B (negative) 0.71 4 Sri Lanka B+ (stable) 0.65 
Sri Lanka B (stable) 0.7 5 Venezuela B+ (stable) 0.65 
Turkey BB- (negative) 0.61 6 Vietnam  BB- (negative) 0.61 
Venezuela BB- (negative) 0.61 7 Nigeria BB- (stable) 0.6 
Indonesia BB- (stable) 0.6 8 Turkey BB- (stable) 0.6 
Nigeria BB- (stable) 0.6 9 Indonesia BB (stable) 0.55 
Philippines BB- (stable) 0.6 10 Philippines BB (stable) 0.55 
Vietnam BB (negative) 0.56 11 Romania BB+ (negative) 0.51 
Romania BB+ (negative) 0.51 12 Colombia BB+ (stable) 0.5 
Colombia BB+ (stable) 0.5 13 Egypt BB+ (stable) 0.5 
Egypt BB+ (stable) 0.5 14 Azerbaijan BB+ (stable) 0.5 
Azerbaijan BB+ (stable)  0.5 15 Kazakhstan BBB- (negative) 0.46 
Kazakhstan BBB- (negative) 0.46 16 Brazil BBB- (stable) 0.45 
Brazil BBB- (stable) 0.45 17 Bulgaria BBB- (stable) 0.45 
India BBB- (stable) 0.45 18 India BBB- (stable) 0.45 
Peru BBB- (stable) 0.45 19 Peru BBB- (stable) 0.45 
Bulgaria BBB (negative) 0.41 20 Hungary BBB (stable) 0.4 
Hungary BBB (negative) 0.41 21 Mexico BBB+ (negative) 0.36 
Russia BBB (negative) 0.41 22 Russia BBB+ (negative) 0.36 
South Africa BBB+ (negative) 0.36 23 South Africa BBB+ (negative) 0.36 
Thailand BBB+ (negative) 0.36 24 Thailand BBB+ (negative) 0.36 
Mexico BBB+ (stable) 0.35 25 Malaysia A- (stable) 0.3 
Malaysia A- (stable) 0.3 26 Poland A- (stable) 0.3 
Poland A- (stable) 0.3 27 Chile A (stable) 0.25 
Chile  A+ (stable) 0.2 28 China A+ (stable) 0.2 
China A+ (stable) 0.2 29 Saudi Arabia AA- (stable) 0.15 
Saudi Arabia AA- (stable) 0.15 30    
Note: Rankings for the S&P and FITCH are ordered from riskiest to least risky emerging country for the period 2008. S&P have ratings for 30 emerging countries where 
Algeria and Iran have no ratings for 2008 period. Whereas, FITCH have rating for 29 countries where Algeria, Iran and Pakistan have no ratings for 2008 period.   
Table 7 (continued) 
 
Country rating rankings of the S&P in 2009 and 2010 
S&P Rankings in 2009  S&P Rankings in 2010 
Country S&P Rating S&P Mapping Rank Country S&P Rating S&P Mapping 
Ecuador CCC+ (stable) 0.8 1 Ecuador CCC+ (stable) 0.8 
Ukraine  CCC+ (stable) 0.8 2 Argentina B- (stable) 0.75 
Argentina B- (stable) 0.75 3 Pakistan B- (stable) 0.75 
Pakistan  B- (stable) 0.75 4 Ukraine B- (positive) 0.74 
Sri Lanka B (positive) 0.69 5 Sri Lanka B (positive) 0.69 
Nigeria B+ (stable) 0.65 6 Nigeria B+ (stable) 0.65 
Venezuela BB- (negative) 0.61 7 Philippines BB- (stable) 0.6 
Philippines BB- (stable) 0.6 8 Venezuela BB- (stable) 0.6 
Turkey BB- (stable) 0.6 9 Vietnam BB (negative) 0.56 
Indonesia BB- (positive) 0.59 10 Indonesia BB (positive) 0.54 
Vietnam BB (negative) 0.56 11 Turkey BB (positive) 0.54 
Romania BB+ (negative) 0.51 12 Colombia BB+ (stable) 0.5 
Colombia BB+ (stable) 0.5 13 Egypt BB+ (stable) 0.5 
Egypt BB+ (stable) 0.5 14 Romania BB+ (stable) 0.5 
Azerbaijan BB+ (positive) 0.49 15 Azerbaijan BB+ (positive) 0.49 
India BBB- (negative) 0.46 16 India BBB- (negative) 0.46 
Brazil BBB- (stable) 0.45 17 Brazil BBB- (stable) 0.45 
Hungary BBB- (stable) 0.45 18 Hungary BBB- (stable) 0.45 
Kazakhstan BBB- (stable) 0.45 19 Kazakhstan BBB- (stable) 0.45 
Peru BBB- (stable) 0.45 20 Peru BBB- (stable) 0.45 
Bulgaria BBB (stable) 0.4 21 Bulgaria BBB (stable) 0.4 
Mexico BBB (stable) 0.4 22 Mexico BBB (stable) 0.4 
Russia BBB (stable) 0.4 23 Russia BBB (stable) 0.4 
South Africa BBB+ (negative) 0.36 24 South Africa BBB+ (negative) 0.36 
Thailand BBB+ (negative) 0.36 25 Thailand BBB+ (negative) 0.36 
Malaysia A- (stable) 0.3 26 Malaysia A- (stable) 0.3 
Poland A- (stable) 0.3 27 Poland A- (stable) 0.3 
Chile  A+ (stable) 0.2 28 Chile A+ (stable) 0.2 
China A+ (stable) 0.2 29 China A+ (stable) 0.2 
Saudi Arabia AA- (stable) 0.15 30 Saudi Arabia AA- (stable) 0.15 
Note: Rankings for S&P are ordered from riskiest to least risky country for the period 2009 and 2010. S&P have ratings for 30 emerging countries 
where Algeria and Iran have no ratings for 2009 and 2010 period.  
Table 8 
Spearman rank correlation between S&P and FITCH rating rankings and the optimal economic, political, 
financial and overall risk rankings 
 
Spearman Rank correlation between S&P ranking and optimal rankings in 2008 
 Mapping S&P Economic Political Financial Overall 
Mapping S&P 1     
Economic 0.0503 1    
Political 0.4674** -0.3386 1   
Financial 0.3236 0.2754 0.3386 1  
Overall 0.3016 0.3298 0.3088 0.9912* 1 
Note: 19 countries that have overlapping data for all indices are used to obtain the spearman rank correlations. *, ** and *** 
denotes the significance of the spearman rank correlation at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Spearman rank correlation is 
significant between the S&P ranking and our political risk ranking.  
 
Spearman Rank correlation between S&P ranking and optimal rankings in 2008 (Separate analysis) 
  Economic Political Financial Overall 
Number of 
observations 
 23 30 21 19 
Spearman’s Rho S&P 0.0436 0.3943** 0.3462 0.3016 
Note: The Spearman rank correlation between the S&P ranking and each optimal index’s ranking is analyzed separately. The first 
row offers the number of countries used to obtain the Spearman’s rho coefficient between S&P and each respective index. The 
second row offers the Spearman’s rho coefficients. *, ** and *** denotes the significance of the spearman rank correlation at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Spearman Rank correlation between FITCH ranking and optimal rankings in 2008 
 Mapping 
FITCH 
Economic Political Financial Overall 
Mapping 
FITCH 
1     
Economic -0.1882 1    
Political 0.4730** -0.4421*** 1   
Financial 0.2183 0.1785 0.3209 1  
Overall 0.1601 0.2136 0.2962 0.9917* 1 
Note: 18 countries that have overlapping data for all indices are used to obtain the spearman rank correlations *, ** and *** 
denotes the significance of the spearman rank correlation at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Spearman rank correlation is 
significant between FITCH ranking and our political risk ranking.  
 
Spearman Rank correlation between FITCH ranking and optimal rankings in 2008 (Separate analysis) 
  Economic Political Financial Overall 
Number of 
observations 
 22 29 20 18 
Spearman’s Rho FITCH -0.0902 0.3815** 0.2578 0.1601 
Note: The Spearman rank correlation between FITCH ranking and each optimal index’s ranking is analyzed separately. The first 
row offers the number of countries used to obtain the Spearman’s rho coefficient between FITCH and each respective index 
ranking. The second row offers the Spearman’s rho coefficients. *, ** and *** denotes the significance of the spearman rank 
correlation at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Relative ranking differences between the optimal overall risk and the S&P ratings in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Optimal Overall Risk                                                            S&P Ratings 
0.6798 Hungary                                               Pakistan  CCC+ (developing) 
0.6771 Pakistan                                             Argentina B- (stable) 
0.6623 China                                                     Turkey BB- (negative) 
0.6588 Thailand                                           Venezuela BB- (negative) 
0.6483 Indonesia                                           Indonesia BB- (stable) 
0.6257 Bulgaria                                                Nigeria BB- (stable) 
0.6200 Argentina                                        Philippines BB- (stable) 
0.6146 Venezuela                                          Colombia BB+ (stable) 
0.6131 Philippines                                              Brazil BBB- (stable) 
0.6095 Turkey                                                      India BBB- (stable) 
0.5775 India                                                           Peru BBB- (stable) 
0.5658 Brazil                                                   Bulgaria BBB (negative) 
0.5599 Colombia                                            Hungary BBB (negative) 
0.5482 Peru                                                     Thailand BBB+ (negative) 
0.5389 Malaysia                                               Mexico BBB+ (stable) 
0.5242 Poland                                                Malaysia A- (stable) 
0.5241 Nigeria                                                   Poland A- (stable) 
0.4967 Mexico                                                     Chile  A+ (stable) 
0.4425 Chile                                                        China A+ (stable) 
Note: Rankings for the optimal overall risk and S&P are ordered from riskiest to least risky 
emerging country for the period 2008. 19 countries that have overlapping data for both indices are 
used for comparison. The lines between the two lists indicate changes in relative ranking.  
Table 10 
Spearman rank correlation between sovereign bond interest rate spreads and the optimal economic, 
political, financial and overall risk rankings 
 
Spearman rank correlation between sovereign bond spreads and optimal risk rankings 
 Bond interest 
rate spreads 
Economic 
risk index 
Political 
risk index 
Financial 
risk index 
Overall 
risk index 
Bond interest rate spreads 1     
Economic risk index 0.2230 1    
Political risk index  0.2402 -0.3775 1   
Financial risk index  0.4926** 0.2108 0.3456 1  
Overall risk index  0.4975** 0.2794 0.3039 0.9877 1 
Note: 17 countries that have overlapping data for all indices are used to obtain the spearman rank correlations. *, **, 
and *** denotes the significance of the spearman rank correlation at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Spearman 
rank correlation is significant between sovereign bond spreads & our financial and overall rankings.   
 
Spearman rank correlation between sovereign bond spreads and optimal risk rankings  
(Separate analysis 
  Economic 
risk index 
Political 
risk index 
Financial 
risk index 
Overall 
risk index 
Number of 
observations 
  
20 
 
25 
 
19 
 
17 
Spearman’s Rho Bond interest  
rate  spreads 
0.1624 0.3423*** 0.5105** 0.4975** 
Note: The Spearman rank correlation between the bond interest rate spreads and each optimal index’s ranking is 
analyzed separately. The first row offers the number of countries used to obtain the Spearman’s rho coefficient 
between the bond interest rate spreads and each respective index. The second row offers the Spearman’s rho 
coefficient. *, ** and *** denotes the significance of the spearman rank correlation at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
